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ABSTRACT

Neo-marxist theory provides a better tool for educational researchers than other research methodologies because of its focus on empowering the dispossessed and its interest in the relationships between human activity and material circumstances. Traditional educational research is rooted in the positivist tradition and claims to be value neutral but the neutrality and objectivity it claims acts as a mask to cover the fact that such research serves the interests of the privileged. Neo-marxist critical theory, in contrast, considers the relationship of the curriculum to the larger society and the structural reasons behind the exclusion of certain areas from the curriculum. From this perspective, curriculum is at the center of the power struggle over what should be taught; what is excluded from the curriculum is as important as what is included. By clarifying the role of the curriculum, it is also possible for people to use this knowledge to assert control over its content and thus over the schools and their own lives. An eight-page bibliography of educational research in this area and a definition of neo-marxism are also included. (IS)

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EMPOWERING RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

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March 1985

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EMPOWERING RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

> The attempt to produce value-neutral social science is increasingly being abandoned as at best unrealizable, and at worst self-deceptive, and is being replaced by social sciences based on explicit ideologies (Hesse, 1980, p. 247).

This paper explores the methodological issues involved in the search for empowering approaches to the generation of curricular knowledge. I include myself among those Schubert, Willis and Short term "neo-Marxist curriculumists" (1984, p. 71). I choose neo-Marxist critical theory as my conceptual foundation for two primary reasons. One is its emancipatory intent. Openly ideological in its advocacy for the dispossessed, it provides a powerful and sustained argument that unmasks how "neutrality" and "objectivity" in knowledge production and legitimation function to secure the forces of privilege. In the case of curriculum, critical theory alerts one to the structural reasons underlying curricular exclusion and bias and identifies the curriculum as a site of ideological struggle (Mazza, 1983).

Secondly, the focus of neo-Marxist theory on the interface between human agency and the press of material circumstances, both constraining and enabling, sheds light on the possibilities for using curriculum to help people understand and assert control over their

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lives. Jean Anyon writes:

> Just as schooling has hitherto supported patterns of power and domination, so it can be used to foster autonomy and social change. . . To argue that ideologies influence behavior is to accord real power to symbols and symbolic forms in education. . . Social change is intimately connected with changes in available cultural symbols and meanings. . . the availability of ideological alternatives increases the likelihood of power shifts and changes (1979, p. 385).

Across the discliplines, critical theory is breaking down a powerful consensus regarding the appropriate substantive, theoretical and methodological concerns of social analysis (Bernstein, 1976; Fay, 1975; Giddens, 1979; Giroux, 1981). The role of the school has not been overlooked (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Althusser, 1971). Called variously the new sociology of education (Bernstein, 1977; Young, 1971), neo-Marxist critical ethnography of schooling (Foley, 1980; Ogbu, 1981; Maseman, 1982), reconceptual curriculum theory (Pinar, 1978, 1981); and social reproduction theory of education (Anyon, 1981; Apple, 1982; Giroux, 1981; Wexler, 1982; Feinberg, 1983), the long effort to "scientize" and, hence, depoliticize schooling has encountered its most cogent group of critics. Through theoretical advances that do justice to the complexity of the relationship between schooling and the needs of a corporate economy, the school's role in social reproduction is being clarified, illuminating what Pinar calls "the order of structural transformation necessary to honor commitments to human rights and justice" (1981, p. 439).

The last few years bear witness to the fruits of applying critical theory to the study of schooling. Beginning in Britain, neo-Marxist researchers are amassing an increasingly provocative body

of empirical work (Willis, 1977; McRobbie, 1978; Anyon, 1983; Apple, 1983). There is a new spotlight on curriculum as a key substantive issue (Young, 1971; Apple, 1979; Giroux, Penna and Pinar, 1981). Curriculum is located at a nexus of power and control as opposed to the claims of neutrality of earlier curriculum theorists (Bobbitt, 1918; Tyler, 1949; Popham and Baker, 1970). The concept of the hidden curriculum assumes a central role in curriculum inquiry (Giroux, 1981) and the formal or "official" curriculum is defined as a "selective tradition" (Williams, 1977) where what is missing is seen as being as important a curricular question as what is included.

This, then, is the context from which I speak. After overviews of the emergent paradigm shift in educational research and the move from critique to theory building among neo-Marxist curricularists, this paper will focus on the methodological implications of critical theory for curriculum research.

The Emergent Paradigm Shift in Educational Research

A control-oriented conception of educational research that would eventually lead to a highly predictive educational science was formulated by E.L. Thorndike at the turn of the century. Understandable as part of the "social engineering" ideology of the time, Thorndike's dictums are distressing only in their continued dominance. Broad based questioning of the assumptions underlying the scientific methods used in educational research has begun to appear only recently (Eisner, 1979; Guba and Lincoln, 1981, 1982; Pinar, 1978; Giroux, 1981; Bredo and Feinberg, 1982; Feinberg, 1983).

Largely behavioristic in its psychology and positivist in its philosophy, the dominant orientation for the conduct of scientific inquiry in education has borne little fruit. Originally seized upon to lay metaphysical ghosts to rest and to lift the field into scientific respectability (Callahan, 1962), these reductionist[1] philosophies have led to a barren methodological orthodoxy where "no significant differences between treatments" has been the rule for fifty years.

A recent survey of teacher effectiveness research concluded that "our best ideas about how an effective teacher of cognitive skills and content behaves" are inconsistent at best, unavoidably damning of strongly held theoretical convictions (Coker, Medley and Soar, 1980). In spite of such criticism, the dominant argument has been for increased persistence in refining the orthodox approach. This view is well represented by Nathaniel Gage in The Scientific Basis of the Art of Teaching. Gage argues that the "by now familiar impression that research on teaching has yielded almost completely equivocal, nonsignificant, and inconsistent findings" (1978, p. 26) ignores the useful knowledge packed into the studies. Unpacking such knowledge through techniques of reviewing and "meta-analysis" will yield low-inference, "teacher-should" statements and free teaching from non-scientifically based guidance. Gage's central argument is that "Research on teaching may well be in a stage similar to the sixty-year pre-penicillin stage of medicine--one in which the necessary knowledge and understanding must accumulate so that breakthroughs can be exploited" (p. 92). In other words, Kuhnian "normal science" is what educational research needs.[2]

What Gage and those he represents ignore is the need for a basic

examination of research assumptions. Such evocations to simply "Do what we have been doing, but do it better" propel educational research down a philosophically naive road. Robert Oppenheimer, in a talk before the American Psychological Association in 1956, made a plea that psychology stop modeling itself "after a physics which is not there anymore, which has been quite outdated". If such research assumptions were twenty years out of date with developments in physics and philosophy of science in 1956, their continuance today is cause for alarm. That alarm was sounded in a 1980 lecture by Michael Scriven.[3]

Charging that the orthodox inquiry mode had stultified educational research and caused "worship of methodology at the expense of recognition of context," Scriven baldly stated that the "value-free", atomistic social science model, "has cost us fifty years of wasted intellectual energy" and argued that, "It is time to do better." Restructuring educational research requires "putting the quantitative boys on the defensive" by exposing the field to "the great body of anti-positivist theory and practice that is developing. It is denial of the most dysfunctional kind to continue writing texts and training researchers as if these issues were non-existent." Experimental and statistical orthodoxy must be supplanted by a methodological pluralism that will "raise the level of the dialogue" among educational researchers of varied methodological commitments. Methodological monism, in short, is the bane of educational research.

Scriven's comments encapsulate my own rejection of the dominant orthodoxy within educational research. While there is some usefulness for experimental, quasi-experimental and statistical research within curriculum inquiry, what is needed now is the development of

alternative research practices that honor the fluidity, context-specificity, and essential indeterminacy of the vast majority of human experience. The increasing legitimacy of the naturalistic paradigm offers an encouraging example of the possibilities for new paradigm, postpositivist research in education.

Development of the Naturalistic Alternative in Educational Research

Rooted in the qualitative research traditions of sociology and anthropology, the naturalistic paradigm (Guba and Lincoln, 1981) poses the first serious challenge to the uncritical primacy of positivist orthodoxy in educational research. At first, this alternative approach to educational inquiry was simply transferring the use of ethnographic research techniques to school settings. Increasingly, however, emphasis has shifted to the epistemological level. As basic assumptions regarding human experiencing and the generation of social knowledge are clarified, it becomes increasingly more obvious that the issue is what Kuhn calls a "paradigm shift" in educational research (Wilson, 1977; Guba and Lincoln, 1981, 1982; Smith, 1983; Phillips, 1983; Eisner, 1983).

Epistemologically rooted in phenomenology and operationally rooted in ethnography, naturalistic inquiry is a research paradigm that includes but goes well beyond the mere use of qualitative methods. Given the overriding importance of meaning-making and context in human experiencing (Mishler, 1979), its adherents argue that naturalistic inquiry is generally more appropriate in educational research than positivist orthodoxy.

Positivism with its "context-stripping" experimental design (Mishler, 1979), its claim of universal generalizability (Cronbach, 1975), its concern for prediction and control (Eisner, 1979), its "physics envy" and reification of methods, its root assumption of a singular, fragmentable, context-free "truth", and its a priori imposition of categories and concern with statistical regularities (Guba and Lincoln, 1981): all this is of limited use in answering most educational questions. Rather than the preordinate input/output, low-inference observation measures that have characterized educational research's efforts to study process, field methods that mine tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967) and context specificity (Mishler, 1979) are held to be more fruitful.

The naturalistic paradigm gains increasing legitimacy, if judged only by the attention "paradigm shift" discourse receives in the pages of the Educational Researcher (Smith, 1983; Phillips, 1983; Eisner, 1983). With this new legitimacy, the focus has shifted from critiques of positivist orthodoxy to developing a body of research exemplars which can serve as testimony to the vigor that comes, not from positivist retrenchment, but from viewing the move into the postpositivist era with a sense of possibility rather than loss.

While positivism continues to dominate practice (Guba, 1980; Mishler, 1979), it has lost its theoretical dominance. The popularity of various subjectivist theories throughout the social sciences is a reaction to the crisis of scientific objectivism (Salamini, 1981, p. 97). However, the shift to seeing reality as socially constructed and negotiated (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) is not without problems. By limiting analysis to the actors' perceptions of their situations, research is reduced to a collection of functionalist accounts that

reify subjectivity and obscure the workings of false consciousness and ideological mystification (Foley, 1979). The argument is that Marxism's profound skepticism of both appearances and "common sense" views of reality produces a more valid analysis than phenomenological research. The concepts of false consciousness and mystification argue cogently that limiting analysis to actors' perceptions of their situations is inadequate. Given the reciprocally confirming nature of hegemony, our common sense ways of looking at the world are permeated with meanings that sustain our disempowerment (Gramsci, 1971).

While naturalistic inquiry sees itself as an advance over positivism, its critics argue that its astructural, ahistorical premises result in phenomenological reductionism: the failure to see that reality is more than negotiated accounts, that, to paraphrase Marx, people make history, yes, but not under circumstances of their own choosing (Sharp, 1980; Reynolds, 1981; Giroux, 1981). The "common-sense sociologies"--macro-phenomenology with its social construction of reality, ethnomethodology with its situational and linguistic foci, symbolic interactionism with its concern for the individual in a context of norms--are forms of "intellectual escapism" if viewed from the premise that reality is more than intersubjectivity, that we are both shaped by and shapers of our world (Salamini, 1981, pp. 97-99).

In sum, the new legitimacy of the naturalistic paradigm speaks to the fact that educational research is not impervious to the profound crisis of established paradigms occurring across the disciplines in the social sciences. My work, however, challenges naturalistic as well as positivist research perspectives. Like Shulamit Reinharz, I argue that "since interest-free knowledge is logically impossible, we

should feel free to substitute explicit interests for implicit ones" (1985, p. 17). I argue that openly value-based, advocacy research openly opposed to the maldistribution of power that underlies our society is neither more nor less ideological than is more mainstream research. Rather, those committed to the development of research approaches that challenge the status quo and contribute to a more egalitarian social order have made an "epistemological break" (Hesse, 1980, p. 196) from the positivist insistence upon researcher neutrality and objectivity.

The Challenge of Openly Ideological Research

Research paradigms inherently reflect our beliefs about the world we live in and want to live in (Habermas, 1971; Bernstein, 1976; Fay, 1975; Hesse, 1980). As we come to see how knowledge production and legitimation are historically situated and structurally located, "scholarship that makes its biases part of its argument"[4] arises as a new contender for legitimacy. Just as Freire argues that there is no neutral education, there is no neutral research (Hall, 1975; Westkott, 1977; Reason and Rowan, 1981, p. 489; Guba and Lincoln, 1982). The fact/value dichotomy simply drives values underground. There are no theory-independent facts (Hesse, 1980, p. 172). "Facts" are as much social constructions as are theories and values. It is a positivist insistence that only one truth exists. As Adrienne Rich notes, "There is no 'the truth,' 'a truth'--truth is not one thing, or even a system. It is an increasing complexity" (1979, p. 187). Counter-movements in the human sciences recognize knowledge as "socially constituted, historically embedded, and valuationally based.

Theory serves an agentic function, and research illustrates (vivifies) rather than provides a truth test" (Hendrick, 1983, p. 506).

The broad parameters of the postpositivist era in the human sciences, hence, are characterized by the following: the methodological and epistemological refutation of positivism flourishes (Guba and Lincoln, 1981, 1982; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978); talk of a Kuhnian paradigm shift abounds (Smith, 1983; Phillips, 1983; Eisner, 1983); more interactive, contextualized, humanly compelling research methods gain increasing legitimacy (Reinharz, 1979, 1983; Reason and Rowan, 1981; Sabia and Wallulis, 1983); openly value based, advocacy research adds its voice to the present methodological ferment (Fay, 1977; Nowotny and Rose, 1979; Hesse, 1980; Roberts, 1981; Hall, 1981; McRobbie, 1982; Comstock, 1982; Bowles and Duelli-Klein, 1983; Mies, 1984; Reinharz, 1985).

Three research programs, feminist research, neo-Marxist critical ethnography, and Freirian "empowering" or participatory research, exemplify what Hesse, borrowing from Althusser, terms the "epistemological break" of developing a critical social science with an openly emancipatory intent (1980, p. 196). Each research program opposes prevailing scientific norms as inherently supporting the status quo; each is premised upon a "transformative agenda"; and each is concerned with research as praxis (Rose, 1979, p. 279).

Openly value-based research programs are typically discounted as overly subjective and, hence, "non-scientific". Such charges seldom recognize that unproblematic claims of scientific neutrality do not exist and arise out of an objectivity reduced to a canonized methodology for establishing scientific knowledge (Goddard, 1973, p. 18; Cronbach, 1980). Those involved in the search for an openly

value-based postpositivist paradigm for doing empirical research increasingly recognize that what we are faced with is a lack of general procedural canons or specific decision rules for analyzing and verifying data (Moon, 1983; Lather 1983).

Postpositivism has cleared methodology of prescribed rules and boundaries and created a constructive turmoil as a result of successful challenges by philosophers of science during the past several decades (Polkinghorne, 1983, pp. 4-5). No longer does following the correct method guarantee "true" results": "Method does not give truth; it corrects guesses" (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 249).

Efforts to establish the trustworthiness of data generated by more interactive, contextualized, openly ideological research modes must be viewed against the background of the shakiness of validity within positivism, especially the basic construct validity so central to theory building (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). Transcending the relativity of finding only what we are predisposed to look for in our empirical work, however, is essential if the subjectivity inherent in more phenomenologically based research is not to prove its bane as "pointless precision" (Kaplan, 1964) has of the conventional paradigm. Our task becomes the confrontation of issues of empirical accountability in our methodological formulations, the need to offer grounds for accepting a researcher's description and analysis, and the search for workable ways of gathering validity data.

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Neo-Marxist Curricularists: From Critique to Theory Building

Until quite recently, leftists have been better at critiquing existant research than at creating an empirically informed Marxism (Karabel and Halsey, 1977, p. 55; Dickens, 1983, p. 155). A central strength of neo-Marxist categories is their power to illuminate the political nature of knowlege production and legitimation. Critical theory has played a crucial role in countering the effort to depoliticize academic knowledge. Objectivity, neutrality, and value-freedom are seen as legitimizing devices that obscure the ways in which academic knowledge shores up the status quo (Fay, 1975; Habermas, 1971, 1973; Bernstein, 1976).

The recent empirical thrust in neo-Marxist theory building has been primarily interested in the creation of an empirically informed Marxism to meet the criticisms of those, such as Bottomore (1978) and E.P. Thompson (1978), who argue that too much of neo-Marxist social theory is "an immaculate conception which requires no gross empirical impregnation" (Thompson, 1978, p. 13. See, also, Kellner, 1975, p. 149; Wright, 1978, p. 10; Krueger, 1981, p. 59; Comstock, 1982, p. 371). Rather than "value-free" knowledge, critical theorists seek emancipatory knowledge. Emancipatory knowledge increases awareness of the contradictions distorted or hidden by everyday understandings. It directs attention to the possibilities for social transformation inherent in the present configuration of social processes.

Spearheading a more profound exploration of what curriculum is, how it functions to reproduce hegemonic social relations, and how it

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might function in more emancipatory ways, the application of critical theory to the study of curriculum has shifted from an overly determinist, economist focus to an emphasis on human agency. The theoretical construct of counter-hegemony is spotlighted as human beings are no longer viewed as inevitably crushed by the logic of capital. An oversocialized conception of human nature is increasingly recognized as empirically inaccurate and politically suicidal (Apple, 1980-81; Wrong, 1961; Giroux, 1981; Willis, 1977). "Just because there are what we call structural and economic determinants it does not mean that people will unproblematically obey them" (Willis, 1977, p.171). Socialization is recognized as a partial, inconsistent, and oftentimes resisted process (Williams, 1977; Lacey, 1977; Willis, 1977; Everhart, 1983; Anyon, 1983; Giroux, 1983; Pinar, 1981). Such a stance posits a far more complex set of relations between education, ideology and economic structure than is posited by correspondence theories. This more complex view reflects competing class interests and ideologies and sees schools and curriculum as contested terrain (Apple, 1982; Giroux, 1983).

While there is an inbuilt bias in education toward the reproduction of hegemonic meanings and practices, hegemony is fragile (Sharp, 1980; Apple, 1982b; Berlak and Berlak, 1981). Schools, for example, rather than being portrayed as inevitably disempowering and crushingly negative are seen as playing both <u>enabling</u> and <u>constricting</u> roles in social transformation (Giroux, 1981; Apple, 1982; Arnot, 1982). Emphasis now is on the school as <u>mediator</u> in its bridging the worlds of home and work and the needs of state and individual. This analysis illuminates the profound contradictions inherent in teachers' work. Socializing for work and home by class,

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race and gender on the one hand, and fostering self-development and the egalitarian ethos on the other, teachers lives are ripe with contradiction. With contradiction comes the possibilities for oppositional teaching (Giroux, 1983). As Wolpe argues, after Bourdieu and Passeron, we must break away from monolithic conceptions of schooling and explore the ways educational systems mediate the process of preparing young people for adulthood (1978). The contradictions inherent in the dual role of the schools must be probed. Those doing neo-Marxist critical ethnography of schooling are taking such words to heart as they look at administrative forms, curricula, classroom interactions, teacher training--all are being dissected to shed light on the processes at work in cultural reproduction and the dimensions of the task of social transformation.

This veritable cornucopia of theoretically guided empirical work attests both to the conceptual vitality possible in postpositivist research programs and the dangers of conceptual overdeterminism leading to dogma: circular reinforcement of theory by experience conditioned by theory. Marxism's history of sectarianism and "theoretical imperialism" (Thompson, 1978) demonstrates the need for open, flexible theory building grounded in a body of empirical work ceaselessly confronted with, and respectful of, the experiences of people in their daily lives. Far too often, however, one is left with the impression that neo-Marxist research is conducted to provide empirical specificities for more general, a priori theory.

How is a priori theory to function in research committed to open-ended, dialectical theory building which aspires to focus and be resonant with lived experience and yet insists that experience must be reconceptualized to include the need for struggle against privilege?

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How is emancipatory theory building different from grounded theory building which argues that minimizing researcher-imposed definitions of the situation is essential for theory generation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967)? How does one avoid phenomenological reductionism by taking into account the deep structures, both psychological and structural, conscious and unconscious, that shape human experience and perceptions and yet not commit the sin of theoretical imposition? These are central questions in the effort to formulate a style of empirical research which advances emancipatory theory building.

Additionally, too often, such work is characterized by an attitude toward the researched captured in the words of one research team: "We would not expect the teachers interviewed to either agree with or necessarily understand the inferences which were made from their responses" (Bullough, Goldstein and Holt, 1982, p. 133). Given the all-male research team and the largely female teacher subjects, one could make much of the gender politics involved in such a statement. But the crucial issue here is the implications of such a stance for the purposes of emancipatory theory building and the empowerment of the researched. One of the central tasks of my argument is to encourage those of us who do critical inquiry to begin to question how such an attitude differs from what Shulamit Reinharz has termed the "rape model of research" so characteristic of mainstream research: career advancement of social scientists built on alienating and exploitative methods (1979, p. 95).

To sum up the first half of this paper: The foundation of postpositivism is the cumulative, trenchant, and increasingly definitive critique of the inadequacies of positivist assumptions in the face of the complexities of human experiencing (Kaplan, 1964;

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Cronbach, 1975; Bernstein, 1976; Mishler, 1979; Giroux, 1981; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Feinberg, 1983). It is a time when the orthodox paradigm for inquiry in the human sciences proves obsolete and new visions are required (Rose, 1979; Schwartz and Ogilvy, 1979; Hesse, 1980; Reason and Rowan, 1981). Those committed to the development of a change enhancing, interactive, contextualized approach to curriculum research amass a body of empirical work increasingly provocative in both theory and method (Willis, 1977; McRobbie, 1978; Berlak and Berlak, 1981; Anyon, 1983; Everhart, 1983; Sears, 1984; Bullough, Goldstein and Holt, 1984; Miller, 1983; Tripp, 1984, McNeil, 1984).

The result is a rich ferment in contemporary discourse regarding empirical research in the human sciences, a discourse that spans epistemological, theoretical and, to a much less developed degree, methodological issues. Within radical educational theorizing, for example, while several calls for an end to the dichotomy between empirical work and radical theorizing have been sounded (Wexler, 1982; Anyon, 1982; Ramsay, 1983), the lack of clear strategies for linking theory and research is pervasive. The argument that follows is rooted in that rich ferment and hopes to shed light on the methodological implications of critical theory for curriculum inquiry.

Empowering Approaches to the Generation of Curricular Knowledge

> For persons, as autonomous beings, have a moral right to participate in decisions that claim to generate knowledge about them. Such a right. . . protects them. . . from being managed and manipulated. . . the moral principle of respect for persons is most fully honored when power is shared not only in the application. . . but also in the generation of knowledge. . . doing research on persons involves an

> important educational commitment to provide conditions under which subjects can enhance their capacity for self-determination in acquiring knowledge about the human condition (Heron, 1981, pp. 34-35).

Krueger notes, "There are hardly any attempts at the development of an alternative methodology in the sense of an 'emancipatory' social research to be explored and tested in substantive studies" (1981, p. 59). If Giddens is right that the task of a critical social science is to explore the nature of the intersection between choice and constraint and that questions of power become central (1979), is this not equally true of the research situation itself? Just as we have come to see that evolving an empowering pedagogy is an essential step in social transformation, doesn't the same hold true for our research approaches?

What I am arguing for here goes well beyond the action research concept which, beginning over thirty years ago with Lewin, has become "a very active and lively field" in Britain and Australia over the past decade (Tripp, 1984, p. 20). While Tripp (1984) and Grundy (1982) note the existence of some critical and emancipatory action research, the vast majority of this work lies within an existing and unproblematized value system which lends itself to subversion by those "who are tempted to use merely the technical form as a means of engineering professional teacher development (Tripp, 1984, p. 20).

An emancipatory social research requires evolving empowering approaches to research where both researcher and researched become, in the words of feminist singer-poet, Chris Williamson, "the changer and the changed." The research process is a powerful place to go for praxis to the extent we can formulate research designs that change

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people by encouraging self reflection and a deeper understanding of their situations in the world. In beginning to grapple with the implications for research design of the quest for empowering approaches to curriculum inquiry, I will focus on three interwoven issues: the need for reciprocity, dialectical theory building versus theoretical imposition, and issues of validity in openly ideological, advocacy research.

The Need for Reciprocity

> No intimacy without reciprocity (Oakley, 1981, p. 49).

Reciprocity means correspondingly powerful give and take, a mutuality in the negotiation of meaning and power. It operates on two primary levels in empirical research: the reciprocity between researcher and researched and that between data and theory. The latter will be dealt with in the next section of this paper. It is to the reciprocity between researcher and researched that I now turn.

Reciprocal research designs are not uncommon in feminist research (Oakley, 1981; Mies, 1984) and they are the norm in both responsive evaluation studies (Stake, 1975) and Freirian participatory research (Hall, 1981). Drawing from examples in these areas as well as those attempting to evolve empowering research strategies in curriculum inquiry, I offer the following observations regarding the use of reciprocity in research designed to change, not merely understand the world.

Reciprocity in research design is a matter of both intent and degree. Regarding intent, historically, reciprocity has been an issue

in fieldwork in terms of setting up the conditions to generate rich data (Wax, 1952). Everhart, for example, sees reciprocity as important because it "is an excellent data gathering technique" (1977, p. 10). He traces the evolution from detachment to involvement in his two-year study of student life in a junior high school where he comes to recognize "the place of reciprocity in productive fieldwork" (p. 8). Reciprocity, for Everhart, means the researcher's movement from stranger to friend in an attempt to gain personal knowledge from subjects. I argue that we must go beyond the concern for more and better data to a concern for research as praxis. What I suggest is that our intent more consciously be to use our research to help participants understand and change their situations.

Curriculum researchers sometimes discover the importance of reciprocity through their need for more trustworthy interpretations. Tetreault (1985), for example, began her evaluation study of a four-week N.E.H. funded faculty development seminar on integrating perspectives and materials on women into general studies courses using a traditional research design. She found herself experimenting with "a new paradigm of research methodologies and procedures" (p. 20) as she realized the need for the participation of the researched in cross-checking the coding of syllabi and interviews. An unexpected reciprocity developed which helped place confidence in the usefulness of the Feminist Phase Theory Evaluation Model to analyze pre and post seminar interviews and syllabi.

Reeves (1983), in contrast to Tetreault, consciously designed her research comparing mothers' and female teachers' educational practices by race and class "to serve an educative function by raising individuals' consciousness. . . so that they can decide how to change

conditions they themselves find unsatisfactory" (i). Calling her approach " a dialectical research strategy", Reeves built her methods upon the critique of both positivism and interpretive sociology and the development of participatory research based on Freire's work. She borrows the term dialectical research from Lindsay's discussion of the role of intellectuals and social scientists in the Caribbean (1975).

Like Reeves, other curriculum researchers use reciprocity in a dialectical manner. Laslett and Rapoport, studying school leavers in Britain (1975), term their approach "collaborative interviewing and interactive research." A central component of their research design is repeated interviews (they argue for a minimum of three) as "essential to deal with the feelings roused, often covertly, in order to 'unlock' deeper levels of data content" (p. 973). Furthermore, they urge the "'giving back'" to respondents a picture of how the data are viewed, both to stymie "rape" models of research and for the purpose of checking descriptive and interpretive validity.

A Marxist survey researcher expands the use of reciprocity to entail identifying, through initial interviews, a group of 12-15 to hold a series of open discussions around the mismatch between formal education and the way people live their lives. This resulted in a collectively generated survey to be given to one hundred, a survey couched in the language of respondents and "in terms of the social categories through which they perceive the world" (Carr-Hill, 1984, p. 281). Additionally, evaluation seminars were made available to those interested in order to use survey results to stimulate respondents "to critically analyze their own educational history and its relation to their present life-styles" (p. 281).

Two naturalistic evaluators, in a report on a four-year project

assessing the curricular reform movements of the 1960's, illustrate a maximal approach to reciprocity in research design. Their goal was to move people from articulating what they know to theorizing about what they know, a process they term "collaborative theorizing" (Kushner and Norris, 1980-81, p. 27). Negotiation was the hallmark of their methodology: negotiation of description, interpretation and the organizing principles of the first draft report. While they note that, given time constraints, final drafts are usually the preserve of the researcher, they hold out as "an attractive aspiration" that participants be involved in the final negotiation of meanings. Such collaboration, they argue, would offer "an opportunity to extend the range of theories and meanings. . . to give participants the dignity of contributing to theorizing about their worlds. . . [and], through sharing meaning-production,. . . develop significant understandings of schooling and education" (p. 35).

As a final example, based on case studies in alienation and the school to work transition, Tripp argues for the interview as co-authorship and negotiation (1983). One-to-one and group discussions were held "as a means of developing participants' view' (p. 32); co-authored statements produced an agreed-upon account of the views of the participants--all in a conscious effort to democraticize the research situation. Tripp argues, however, that "the negotiation process must be clearly bounded" (p. 38) because participants often wish to "unsay" their words. Tripp's position on this is that researchers are not so much owners of data as they are "majority shareholders" who must justify decisions and give participants a public forum for critique. "The right to negotiate was replaced by the right to comment" (p. 39).

What Tripp's research design is missing, however, is the interactive involvement of participants in the negotiation of meaning. Reciprocity becomes reduced to a component of the early stages of an investigation, but not the latter stages of the construction of interpretation and empirically grounded theorizing. His research design allows skirting of the entire issue of false consciousness, an issue central in any maximal approach to reciprocity.

Brian Fay argues that we must develop criteria/theory to distinguish between reasoned rejections of interpretations and theoretical arguments and false consciousness (1977). This addresses what Fay considers a glaring gap, a black hole,[5] if you will, in critical theory: "the conditions that must be met if people are going to be in a position to actually consider it [critical theory] as a possible account of their lives" (p. 218). We need to discover the necessary conditions before people are willing to do ideology critique, given the psychological hold of illusion, "the things people cling to because they provide direction and meaning in their lives" (p. 214). As Fay notes, there is much to be learned here by looking at feminist consciousness-raising groups.

Throughout the late 1960's and 1970's, thousands of small groups all over the country developed in a grass-roots fashion to provide a way for women to exchange thoughts, experiences and feelings. Out of this emerged the feminist maxim that "the personal is political" or, to paraphrase feminist historian, Jo Freeman, what was thought to be an individual problem was seen to be a social problem requiring a political solution (1975). Fay argues that such groups teach us the following:

> Coming to a radical new self-conception is hardly ever a process that occurs simply by reading some theoretical work; rather, it requires an environment of trust, openness, and support in which one's own perceptions and feelings can be made properly conscious to oneself, in which one can think through one's experiences in terms of a radically new vocabulary which expresses a fundamentally different conceptualization of the world, in which one can see the particular and concrete ways that one unwittingly collaborates in producing one's own misery, and in which one can gain the emotional strength to accept and act on one's new insights.
>
> The experience of the Women's Movement confirms that radical social changes through rational enlightenment requires some mechanism for ensuring that those conditions necessary for such enlightenment will be established and maintained (1977, p. 232).

My argument, then, is that to the degree the goal of research is at least as much to encourage self-reflection and deeper understanding on the part of the researched as it is to generate empirically grounded theoretical knowledge, more than a minimal degree of reciprocity is an essential component of empowering research designs. Operationally, reciprocity in research designs can be summarized as follows.

-Interviews are conducted in an interactive, dialogic manner that entails self-disclosure on the part of the researcher.

-Sequential interviews encourage the building of collaboration and the deeper probing of research issues.

-Group interviews encourage deeper probing.

-Negotiation characterizes much of the interpretation of meaning, negotiation that, in what I find the particularly exciting designs, exceeds the collaborative validation of the descriptive level by including collaborative validation of interpretation and empirically rooted theory building.

-Issues of false consciousness must be faced in a way that goes

beyond dismissing resistance to Marxist interpretations as false consciousness (for a similar argument, see Apple, 1980-81). There is a profound hubris in viewing the neo-Marxist researcher as "interpreter of the world," exposer of false consciousness (Reynolds, 1980-81, p. 87). This non-dialectical, non-reciprocal perception of the role of the researcher confounds neo-Marxist researchers' intent of demystifying the world for the dispossessed. Respondents become objects, targets of research, rather than active subjects empowered to understand and change their situations. The theoretical gap pointed out by Fay must be acknowledged and work must be begun to flesh out our understanding of the nature of maximal reciprocity, the involvement of research participants in the construction and validation of knowledge.

Dialectical Theory Building Versus Theoretical Imposition

> I do not believe that imposing Marxist rather than bourgeois categories is socialist practice (Carr-Hill, 1984, p. 290).

Philip Wexler (1982) argues that a form of "theoretical authoritarianism" has resulted in radical educational theory being characterized by "theoreticism" where "the content of theories is not extended, developed, synthesized, or practically tested" (p. 57). This results in "the current social isolation and political powerlessness of the producers of radical academic educational theory" (1982, p. 53; see, also, Comstock, 1982, p. 371).

Moving beyond predisposition requires systematizing procedures for understanding the ways that investigator values enter into

research. Empirically grounding theoretical formulations requires a critical stance regarding the inadequacies of our pet theory and an openness to counter interpretations. Michael Apple's caution that, given the theory dependence of critical ethnography, "conceptual validity precedes empirical accuracy" (1980-81) continues to not see the validity problems inherent in the largely undialectical role that theory plays in critical ethnography. Empirical evidence must be viewed as a mediator for a constant self and theoretical interrogation if neo-Marxist theory is to transcend "the hubris of the social sciences in both their naturalistic and critical guises" (Moon, 1983, p. 28) or what Fay notes as the irony of domination and repression in most of our efforts to free one another (1977, p. 209).

What is needed is research designs that allow us to reflect on how our value commitments insert themselves into our empirical work. Our own frameworks of understanding need to be critically examined as we look for the tensions and contradictions they might entail (Feinberg, 1983, pp. 159-160; Bredo and Feinberg, 1982, p. 439). In his critique of Jean Anyon's work as telling us more about her predispositions than about the phenomena studied, Peter Ramsay especially critiques Anyon's <u>certainty</u> and <u>clear-cutness</u>: "While we would agree that there is no such thing as 'value-free' or objective research, we would argue that there is a need to keep as open a frame of reference as is possible to allow the data to generate the propositions" (1983, p. 316).

Ungrounded theory constrains the seeing process. The search is for theory which grows out of context embedded data, not in a way that rejects a priori theory, but in a way that keeps it from distorting the logic of evidence. Theory is too often used to protect us from

the awesome complexity of the world, and, yet, "the road to complexity is what we are on in our empirical efforts" (Clark, 1984, p. 49). The goal of theoretically guided empirical work is to develop increasing specificity at the contextual level, to see how larger issues are embedded in the particulars of everyday life. If doubt and unexpected outcomes aren't part of our theory building efforts, it seems a sign that we are imposing our theory on the data.

Our empirical work must operate within a conscious context of theory building. Where are the weak points of the theoretical tradition we are operating from within? Are we extending theory? revising it? testing it? corroborating it? Empirically grounded theory means a reciprocal relationship between data and theory. Data must be allowed to generate propositions in a dialectical manner that allows an a priori theoretical framework, but which keeps that framework from becoming the container into which the data must be poured. If critical theory is to change the way social science is conceived of and practiced, it must become genuinely reflexive (Moon, 1983, p. 30).

The search for ways to operationalize reflexivity in critical inquiry is uncharted territory. Sabia and Wallulis point out that, too often, critical self-awareness comes to mean "a negative attitude towards competing approaches instead of its own self-critical perspective" (1983, p. 26). The methodological implications of critical theory are relatively unexplored (Bredo and Feinberg, 1982, p. 281), although some attention is beginning to be focused on the need for an approach to research which advances egalitarian transformation (Apple, 1982; Fay, 1975, 1977; Comstock, 1982). The following guidelines for operationalizing reflexivity in critical

inquiry can be drawn from that small body of work.

-Critical inquiry is rooted in the experience and thwarted desires and the repressed needs of people (Fay, 1975). The initial task is to develop an interpretive understanding of the meaning world of subjects. Dialogic validity becomes central here. The purpose of this phase of inquiry is to provide accounts that will serve as a basis for further analysis and "as a corrective to the investigator's preconceptions regarding the subjects' life-world and experiences" (Comstock, p. 381).

-The task of critical inquiry is to inspire and guide the dispossessed in the process of cultural transformation by means of what Mao terms "Teach[ing] the masses clearly what we have learned from them confusedly" (quoted in Freire, 1973, p. 82). This requires a dialogic educative aspect at the heart of the research process, "a reciprocal relationship in which every teacher is always a student and every pupil a teacher" (Gramsci quoted in Femia, 1975, p. 41). The present is historicized as the "naturalness" of social arrangements is problematized so that social actors can see both the constraints and the change potential of their situations. "Dialogic education is integral to every research program which treats subjects as active agents instead of objectifying them and reifying their social conditions" (Comstock, 1982, p. 386).

-Contradictions are sought out which help people see how their "ideologically frozen understandings" (Comstock, p. 384) do not serve their interests well. This search for fundamental contradictions must proceed from progressive elements of participants' current understandings, the "partial penetrations" that Willis talks about (1977).

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-The response that subjects make to the claims of a critical account is one criterion of its validity. Fay writes:

> One test of the truth of critical theory is the considered reaction by those for whom it is supposed to be emancipatory. . . Not only must a particular theory be offered as the reason why people should change their self-understandings, but this must be done in an environment in which these people can reject this reason (Fay, 1977, pp. 218-219, original emphasis).

What is needed, then, is dialogic research designs which allow us to begin to grasp the necessary conditions for people to engage in ideology critique and transformative social action.

-The critical researcher stimulates "a self-sustaining process of critical analysis and enlightened action" (Comstock, p. 387) by participating with the research subjects in a theoretically guided program of action over an extended period of time.

Doing such work in a non-elitist and non-manipulative manner requires the maximal reciprocity argued for in the previous section. There, the argument was the need for reciprocity in terms of empowering the researched. The argument here is that we will build more useful theory through such reciprocity. Research designs can be more or less participatory, but some amount of participation is required if we are to operationalize the reflexivity needed to protect our research from our own enthusiasms. Debriefing sessions with participants provide a forum for looking for exceptions to emerging generalizations. Submitting concepts and explanations to the scrutiny of social actors sets up a theoretical exchange that is at the heart of research approaches which both advance emancipatory theory and empower the researched.

The inadequacy of the naturalistic, phenomenological paradigm is

that it bases itself upon the postulate of rationality.[6] Neo-Marxist assumptions regarding false consciousness and ideological mystification, however, teach us that limiting analysis to actors' perceptions of their situations is inadequate. If theory is to explain the structural contradictions at the heart of discontent, it must speak to the felt needs of a specific group in ordinary language (Fay, 1975, p. 98). If it is to spur toward action, theory must be grounded in the self-understandings of the dispossessed even as it seeks to get them to conceive of themselves and their situations differently. This is the central paradox of critical theory and provides its greatest challenge. There is a dialectic between people's self-understandings and our efforts to provide an enabling context to help them conceive of themselves and their situations differently. There, in the nexus of that dialectic, lies our opportunity to create reciprocal, dialogic research designs which both lead to self-reflection and provide a forum in which to test the usefulness, the resonance, of our conceptual and theoretical formulations.

For praxis to be possible, not only must theory teach the progressive social forces; it also must learn from their struggles. Theory adequate to the task of changing the world must be open-ended, non-dogmatic, speaking to and grounded in the circumstances of everyday life and premised on a deep respect for the intellectual and political capacities of the dispossessed. There are profound substantive and methodological implications to this position.

Accessible and relevant theory is energizing, catalytic theory which "clicks" and resonates with the disjunctures and contradictions in people's lives. Grounded in empirical specificity and interactive

reciprocity, theory becomes an expression and elaboration of progressive popular feelings rather than the imposition of intellectuals. Emancipatory theory resonates with people's lived concerns, fears, and aspirations and arises out of theoretically guided empirical grounding.

In sum, the development of emancipatory social theory requires an empirical stance which is open-ended, dialogically reciprocal, grounded in a paradoxical respect for human capacity and a profound skepticism of appearances and "common sense," and a commitment to the long term, broad based ideological struggle necessary to transform structural inequalities.

Issues of Validity[7]

> The job of validation is, not to support an interpretation, but to find out what might be wrong with it. A proposition deserves some degree of trust only when it has survived serious attempts to falsify it (Cronbach, 1980, p. 103).

My central argument is this final section is that those exploring the possibilities for an openly value-based, advocacy paradigm for doing empirical research must begin to be more systematic about establishing the trustworthiness of data. Systematizing the ambiguity of what we do as much as possible does not have to deny the essential indeterminancy of human experiencing, "the irreducible disparity between the being of the world and the knowledge we might have of it" (White, 1973). But if we want illuminating and resonant theory grounded in trustoworthy data, we must formulate self-corrective techniques that will check the credibility of our data and minimize

the distorting effect of personal bias upon the logic of evidence (Kamarovsky, 1981).

With the present epistemological and methodological ferment in the human sciences, paradigmatic uncertainty is leading to the reconceptualization of validity. Efforts to set subjective, tacit knowledge out of the "context of verification" are seen as "naive empiricism". The process of inquiry is increasingly recognized as a tapestry where tacit knowledge is the warp for the woof of propositional knowledge (Heron, 1981, p. 32). With no ready-made formulas to guarantee valid social knowledge, "We must operate simultaneously at epistemological, theoretical and empirical levels with self-awareness" (Sharp and Green, 1975, p. 234). Our best shot at present is to construct research designs that push us toward becoming vigorously self-aware.

Going beyond predisposition in our empirical efforts requires techniques that will give confidence in the trustworthiness of data. Reason and Rowan (1981) want "objectively subjective" inquiry (p. xiii). More systematically, Guba and Lincoln (1981) argue for analogues to the major criteria of rigor within the orthodox paradigm. Guba states that the least we should expect in establishing data trustworthiness in new paradigm research is triangulation, reflexivity and member checks (1981). Reason and Rowan advise borrowing concepts of validity from traditional research, but refining and expanding those concepts in ways appropriate to "an interactive, dialogic logic" (1981, p. 240). Building on all of this, what follows is a reconceptualization of validity appropriate for research openly committed to a more just social order. 33

Guba and Lincoln's (1981) cogent argument that the issue is

data neutrality is key here. Once the issue is seen as the neutrality of data rather than researcher, unabashedly ideological research no longer need apologize for its open commitment to using research to critique and change the status quo. The central issue shifts. The onus becomes the development of data credibility checks to protect our research and theory construction from our enthusiasms. To guard against researcher biases distorting the logic of evidence within openly ideological research, the following guidelines are offered.

-Triangulation is critical in establishing data trustworthiness, a triangulation expanded beyond the psychometric definition of multiple measures to include multiple data sources, methods, and theoretical schemes. What is essential is that the research design must consciously seek counter patterns as well as convergence if data are to be credible.

-Construct validity must be dealt with in ways that recognize its roots in theory construction. Building emancipatory social theory requires a ceaseless confrontation with and respect for the experiences of people in their daily lives to stymie the tendency toward theoretical imposition inherent in theoretically guided empirical work. A systematized reflexivity which gives some indication of how a priori theory has been changed by the logic of the data becomes essential in establishing construct validity in ways that will contribute to the growth of illuminating and change-enhancing social theory.

-Kidder's argument (1982) for a new respect for face validity becomes important here. Face validity historically has been treated lightly and dismissed, but Kidder argues that it is much more complex

and is essentially tied to construct validity. "Research with face validity provides a 'click of recognition' and a 'yes, of course,' instead of 'yes, but' experience" (p. 56). Face validity is operationalized by recycling description, emerging analysis, and conclusions back through at least a subsample of respondents: "good research at the non-alienating end of the spectrum. . . goes back to the subect with the tentative results, and refines them in light of the subjects' reactions" (1981, p. 248). The reality of false consciousness means that limiting analyses to actors' perceptions of their situations is inadequate. There are, hence, limits on the degree to which "member checks" (Guba and Lincoln, 1981) can help establish data valiity. Perhaps, like reliability within positivism, building face validity into our research designs should become a necessary but not sufficient approach to establishing data credibility.

-Finally, given the emancipatory intent of openly ideological research, I argue for the importance of <u>catalytic validity</u> (Reason and Rowan, 1981, p. 240; Brown and Tandom, 1978), the degree to which the research process re-orients, focuses and energizes participants toward what Freire terms conscientization, knowing reality in order to better transform it (1973). Of the guidelines proposed here, this is by far the most unorthodox as it flies directly in the face of the essential positivist tenet of researcher neturality. My argument is premised not only on a recognition of the reality-altering impact of the research process itself, but also on the need to conscously channel this impact so that respondents gain self-understanding and, ideally, self-determination through research participation.

My concern is that efforts to produce social knowledge useful in

the struggle for a more equitable world must pursue rigor as well as relevance. Whether we can do research that appears valid from multiple points of view or whether Heron is correct that truth in research is a function of shared values (1981, p. 33) is presently a moot issue. Given the primitive state of validity issues within openly value-based research (Feinberg, 1983; Reason and Rowan, 1981; White, 1983; Dickens, 1983, p. 151; Moon, 1983, p. 171), we need to recognize both that the "spectre of relativism" may be our inevitable companion as we reshape science away from its positivist incarnation (White, 1983, p. 170), and that the nature of reliable knowledge within new paradigm, openly value-based research must be grounded in Lee Cronbach's point that, "To call for value-free standards of validity is a contradiction in terms, a nostalgic longing for a world that never was" (1980, p. 105).

By arguing for a more systematic approach to triangulation and reflexivity, a new emphasis for face validity, and inclusion of the new concern of catalytic validity, I stand opposed to those who hold that empirical accountability is either impossible to achieve or able to be side stepped in openly value-based, advocacy research.

As the shakiness of validity within the positivist paradigm and the pervasiveness of ideology within the human sciences are increasingly acknowedged (Fay, 1975; Bernstein, 1976; Mishler, 1979; Nowotny and Rose, 1979; Hesse, 1980), we see that what is at first impression the "hard place' of validity coefficients and multitrait-multimethod matrices is, in fact, a soft spot. The rock is not the unassailable validity of positivist research findings but rather the need to establish the trustworthiness of data which are "qualitative, fleeting, and, at times, frankly impressionistic"

(Reason, 1981, p. 185).

Disconcern with data credibility within openly value-based research programs will not improve the chances for the increased legitimacy of the knowledge they produce. Agreed upon procedures are needed which can make empirical decision-making public and, hence, subject to criticism. Most importantly, if we fail to do so, our theory building will suffer as we fail to protect our work from our own passions.

Reason and Rowan's call for "a new rigor of softness' (1981, p. 490), a "validity of knowledge in process" (p. 250), an "objective subjectivity" (p. xiii) may be the best that we can do. But let us begin to insist upon that.

Conclusion

In essence, this paper has one primary argument: that a more collaborative approach to critical inquiry is essential for purposes of the empowerment of the researched, the building of emancipatory theory, and the move toward establishing data credibility within openly value-based, advocacy approaches to empirical inquiry. The present turmoil in the human sciences creates the freedom to construct new designs based on alternative tenets and epistemological commitments. To quote Polkinghorne (1983):

> What is needed most is for practitioners to experiment with the new designs and to submit their attempts and results to examination by other participants in the debate. The new historians of science have made it clear that methodological questions are decided in the practice of research by those committed to developing the best possible answers to their questions, not by armchair philosophers of research (p. xi).

Let us get on with the [illegible].

ENDNOTES

1. "Reductionism holds that to understand the world requires disasembling it into its component parts, and that these parts are in some way more fundamental than the wholes they compose. . . Reductionism is committed to the claim that this is the scientific method, . . ." (Steven Rose, "The Limits to Science." Science for the People, 16(6), 1984, p. 25).

2. Gage ignores Kuhn's point that the social sciences are in a pre-paradigmatic state, a hodgepodge of techniques, largely borrowed from the natural sciences, which are too unformed to support productive normal science. See Kuhn, 1970, p. 160.

3. Henry Lester Smith Research Conference, Indiana University, January, 1980.

4. Phrase used by Jean Anyon in a session of the American Educational Researchers' Association annual Conference, Montreal, 1984.

5. Jim Sears first used this term at the Fifth Curriculum Theorizing Conference, Dayton, 1984.

6. The inadequacies of an over-reliance on rationality in human behavior are eloquently captured in Carol Ascher's letter to Simone de Beauvoir, a letter written to "clear the air" after Ascher had written a biography of de Beauvoir: "I don't think you ever grasped sufficiently the way the unconscious can hold one back from grasping a freedom consciously chosen. Too often I see your sense of freedom being based on a rationalism that denies that murky inner world over which we have as little, or much, control as the world outside us. And, in fact, control would be your word, not mine. For I believe we have to love this deep inner self and try to be in harmony with it (Between Women, Carol Ascher, L. De Salivo, S. Ruccick (Eds.). Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, p. 93).

7. Issues of validity in openly ideological research are dealt with much more fully in Lather, 1983.

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Patti Lather
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What is a Neo-Marxist?

Historically, it means my assumptions about the world are both profoundly affected by Marx's insistence that economic conditions are at the root of a culture's shaping influences and that my brand of Marxism is a revision of Marx. I am, in the words of Albert and Hahnel, an "unorthodox Marxist" (Unorthodox Marxism. Boston: South End Press, 1978).

Neo-Marxism has many camps. Mao's revisions are an example as are cultural Marxism and the "scientific Marxism" of Althusser. My leanings are toward the cultural Marxism of Gramsci and the Frankfurt School of critical theory which argue the importance of ideological struggle as a precondition for structural transformation within advanced monopoly capitalism.

Substantively, being a neo-Marxist, for me, means wanting to study the intersection of choice and constraint in human behavior. To paraphrase Marx, people make history, yes; but not under conditions of their own choosing. I am especially interested in the structures of consciousness in terms of the processes by which people open themselves up to a critique of the status quo and the need to struggle for a more just society.

Methodologically, I am interested in the development of an approach to empirical inquiry which both advances the development of emancipatory social theory and empowers the researched. I am, in essence, a postpositivist exploring the possibilities of an openly value based, advocacy paradigm for doing empirical research in the human sciences.